The problem of Social Order and Morality: Comparing the Views of Erving Goffman and Niklas Luhmann by Maetens, Dirk & Verhoeven, Jef
The Problem of Social Order and Morality:
Comparing the views of Erving Goffman and Niklas Luhmann
Paper presented at the XIIIth World Congress of Sociology
RC 35: Conceptual and Terminological Analysis
July 18-23 1994 at Bielefeld, Germany
Dirk Maetens and Jef C. Verhoeven
(KU Leuven, Belgium)
Draft
"Any discourse is constituted as an attempt to 
dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the 
flow of difference, to construct a centre" 
(Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 112) 
Only a few steps away from entering the twenty-first century, 
sociology seems to be firmly set on a safe and self-programmed 
course to exotic and distant planets known as Scientific 
Maturity, Professional Autonomy, and Intellectual Stardom. Wit-
nessing this flight from the inside, however, we get the distinct 
impression that the nature of the craft itself seems to be 
increasingly difficult to describe. Using a different language 
game, we could say that, as insiders, we experience increasing 
difficulties in observing the growing complexity of the conceptu-
al landscape of sociology. What is 'really' happening during 
this intergalactical flight is something only future historians 
will be able to determine 'once and for all', after close 
analysis of the information gathered on the 'black box' of this 
strange craft. These and similar problems have not prevented 
sociologists from charting the 'Frontiers of Social theory' and 
observing 'New Syntheses' almost everywhere in an attempt to 
reduce the theoretical complexity of the discipline to its micro-
macro form (Ritzer, 1990). As passengers however, we do not feel 
that we are in the best of positions to engage in such an endea-
your. To chart this sociological enterprise and to arbitrate on 
its trials and tribulations would be to take on issues that 
vastly exceed the limits we have placed upon ourselves here. 
So, instead of presenting a reliable roadmap to facilitate safe 
travel we should like to set up a rather different, probably less 
safe, possibly less exotic, but none the less equally fantastic 
project of observing how sociologists observe the unity of their 
discipline and each other. We intend to investigate how they try 
to cope with the tantalizing experience of conceptual complexity. 
Obviously, we can present only one, rather short case to 
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illustrate the intention of this unfinished project. So, we 
decided to take a closer look at one of the more popular 
strategies of reducing complexity (hence creating order) 
available today, i.e. the political reading of sociological 
communication (progressive/conservative). For theory-strategic 
reasons, we decided to observe how Erving Goffman and Niklas 
Luhmann are observed by several fellow sociologists as being 
overly conservative and ideological figures in an otherwise 
progressive and scientific discipline. We will try to indicate 
how this bears on the way Goffman and Luhmann conceptualize the 
problem of social order and especially their views on morality, 
and how this is misunderstood in the 'conservative-uncritical' 
reading of their work. On the contrary, our interpretation of 
both Goffman and Luhmann stresses the 'progressive-critical' 
character of their perspectives. 
1. Erving Goffman: the interaction order as a moral order 
"Of course, it can be argued that to focus on the 
nature of personal experiencing - 
	 - is itself a 
standpoint with marked political implications, and 
that these are conservative ones. I think that this 
is true. I can only suggest that he who would combat 
false consciousness and awaken people to their true 
interests has much to do, because the sleep is very 
deep. And I do not intend here to present a lullaby 
but merely to sneak in and watch the way the people 
snore" (Goffman, 1974: 13-14) 
The above quoted disclaimer of Goffman (1974) in the opening 
pages of Frame Analysis seems to have misled several of his 
commentators into actually believing him. Thomas G. Miller 
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(1984: 141 - our emphasis) states in the same line, first that 
'Goffman's sociological perspective misrepresents certain cases 
of moral behavior in a fundamental way', and then goes on to make 
the bold claim that the dramaturgical perspective makes the moral 
dimension of social action totally 'invisible'. In an attempt 
to downplay the cynical reputation of Goffman, mostly based on 
his Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1959), Phil Manning 
(1989) actually undermines his own goal by acknowledging that 
this reading is at least partially correct. 	 And even the 
otherwise well-documented Jlirgen Habermas (1984: 90-94) depicts 
Goffman in only a few pages as an uncritical cynic focusing on 
the strategic self interests of individual actors, thereby 
forgetting the communicative, rational, and morally respectable 
part of social interaction. Do we have to conclude that Goffman 
indeed neglected to study the moral side of life ? And if so, 
does this necessarily turn his perspective into the conservative 
and uncritical sociology as suggested both in the noted literatu-
re and in Goffman's disclaimer in Frame Analysis ? 
Erving Goffman does not of ten use concepts such as social order 
or social system, and his contribution to social theory is linked 
by himself and others mainly to the idea of an interaction order 
(see e.g. Burns, 1982: 17-47; Drew and Wootton, 1988), which "can 
be identified narrowly as that which uniquely transpires in 
social situations, that is, environments in which two or more 
individuals are physically in one another's response presence" 
(Goffman, 1983: 2). This emergent phenomenon derives its order 
from constraints imposed by the needs of a presentational self 
rather than by social structure. The fact that persons must 
commit themselves to the ground rules of interaction in order to 
maintain their selves is treated by Goffman as a moral, not a 
structural imperative. 
Goffman (1967, 1983) rejects the familiar view that individuals 
and social structure are separate and competing entities. His 
notion of a self which depends for its existence on an order of 
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interaction which is constrained by this dependence allows him 
to argue for the recognition of interaction as a separate domain 
of action which needs to be studied in its own right. In short, 
individual and structure are not conceptualized by Goffman as 
competing entities, but as the joint products of an interaction 
order sui generis. He does not start as usual from social 
structure and individuals who are supposed to conform to or to 
resist this structure. He rather begins with those settings, 
commitments, and understandings which allow agents and social 
structures to have a social presence in the first place: "...what 
I'm doing is the structural social psychology that is required, 
or is natural for sociology. That is, given sociology is a 
central thrust, what can we say about the individual ? Not that 
the individual is the central unit that permits us to study 
society; but if you take society as the basic and substantive 
unit, you can still ask yourself the question - given social 
organization as the central reality - what is it about individu-
als, what is it we have to assume about individuals, so that they 
can be used or be usable socially ?" (Verhoeven, 1993: 322-323). 
It is quite obvious that according to Goffman (1959: 253), the 
social self is a dramaturgical product of social interaction. 
The self is therefore not the ontological starting point for a 
theory of social order. For Goffman (1967: 45) it is an end 
product, the existence of which depends upon a presentation order 
which is the primary constraint of situations of co-presence: 
... a kind of construct, built up not from inner psychic 
propensities but from moral rules that are impressed upon him 
from without". In sum the interaction order has an existence 
independent of either structures or individuals. 
The claim that interaction has an orderly and moral character 
rests for Goffman on the assumption that selves have a ritual 
nature, and that face-to-face interaction is organized along the 
protection of selves during interaction, and the protection of 
the interaction order from self interest. "One's face then, is 
a sacred thing, and the expressive order required to sustain it 
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contractual obligations are generated by the requirements of 
social interaction and the reproduction of the self through its 
relations to other selves in interaction. He refers to this 
level of agreement as a 'working consensus' (Goffman, 1959: 10) 
and states that where there is 'order', there must be a working 
consensus. 	 Therefore, all meaningful relationships of co- 
presence are characterized by this underlying consensus. For 
Goffman, there does not appear to be any meaningful relationship 
where there is not a tacit pledge of some sort: when the 'working 
consensus' is violated, interaction collapses (Goffman, 1967). 
It is therefore, not only moral, but also prudent to act in 
accordance with the working consensus because violating it would 
upset the interaction upon which the maintenance of 'self' 
depends... The 'involvement obligations' which interactants have 
to the interaction per se, appear to delineate a distinct domain 
of social and moral action for Goffman. He finds that a moral 
commitment to the working consensus for its own sake is one of 
the 'ground rules of interaction' (Goffman, 1967: 24). 
Issues of morality remain a central underlying feature of 
Goffman's later work, as evidenced in his Presidential Address 
(1983), but also in Frame Analysis. Although the moral actor is 
not deprived of any importance (1974: 188, 193), Goffman seems 
to be much more interested in the structural background of moral 
behaviour than in its substance. Throughout this study, one 
finds discussions of social activities like demonstrations, 
benign and exploitative fabrications, pornography, misframing, 
breaking the frames, deviant behaviour, etc. (1974: 73, 87-111, 
203, 278, 324-337, 350, 375), but not once does Goffman even 
wonder whether the activity itself is morally good or bad. As 
a sociologist, Goffman wants to show how we organize our 
experiences, and the social organization of moral frames is not 
the exception that confirms the rule... 
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2. Niklas Luhmann: social autopoiesis and the code of the moral 
We assume that posing the question of the critical potential of 
systems theory, whether it be in Luhmann's version or not, may 
come as even more a surprise than the case of Erving Goffman's 
dramaturgical sociology. After the demise of Parsonian systems 
theory we have all stumbled on those criticisms that seek to 
convince us of the conservative, ideological character of this 
perspective. Considering the frequency and simplicity with which 
these and similar objections circulate throughout the sociologi-
cal discipline, finding their way into numerous textbooks, the 
job seems highly succesful. Doing a functionalist analysis of 
this critique of functionalism, Herminio Martins (1974: 247) 
shows how "...functionalism dies every year, every Autumn Term, 
being ritually executed for introductory teaching purposes, its 
life-cycle somewhat resembling the gods of the ancient Near East. 
The critique of functionalist sociological theory is ... a 
pedagogic necessity: the demolition of functionalism is almost 
an initiation rite of passage into sociological adulthood or at 
least adolescence." So, it is no surprise that Niklas Luhmann 
has had his share of similar criticism. 	 Since the early 
seventies, he has been regularly presented as giving uncritical 
descriptions, even apologetic legitimations of social relations. 
These uncritical readings of Niklas Luhmann's work over the years 
have probably been very much influenced by Habermas's (1985: 432) 
negative categorisation of him as an affirmative theorist "who 
lacks any reference point for a critique of modernity." 
Luhmann's (1991b) recent necrology of critical sociology - both 
critical rationalism and the Frankfurt style critical theory -
has probably even confirmed this image (Maetens, 1994). 
Luhmann (1984: 173-177) dismisses the notion of a culturally pre-
established and taken-for-granted social order, which is at the 
centre of most mainstream solutions to the problem of order. In 
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his view the sociological tradition does not really solve this 
problem at all. According to Luhmann, sociology usually only 
delegates the solution to the problem of social order to the 
cultural system, leaving unanswered the crucial question of how 
general values and integrating normative commitments are possible 
in themselves. For Luhmann (1984: 154) 'double contingency' 
means that Alter and Ego (psychic or social systems) may select 
communications from an infinite horizon of alternative possibili-
ties. Alter and Ego are free to reject each other's communica-
tive suggestions, to select alternative expectations and behavi-
ours, not to respond at all, or (intentionally or uninten-
tionally) to misinterpret each other's symbolic gestures. Social 
order does not rest on excluding misunderstanding, conflict, 
deviance, or disappointment but on communication systems deciding 
how to handle deviance, conflict and misunderstanding (Luhmann, 
1984: 164). Here we reach the very core of Luhmann's autopoietic 
paradigm, according to which social order is possible only if 
Alter and Ego mutually adjust their selection patterns, if they 
accept each other's selections as restricting further selectivity 
(Luhmann, 1984: 187-190). 	 When, for whatever reason, Alter 
decides to accept Ego's selection as conditioning his/her own 
selectivity, emergent and self-referential processes of system-
building begin to operate. Since they are 'black boxes' for each 
other, Alter and Ego strenuously look for clues indicating mutual 
expectations; they observe that they are being observed and 
select gestures and behaviours in the light of expected expecta-
tions. "Auf diese Weise kann eine emergente Ordnung zustandekom-
men, die bedingt ist durch die Komplexitt der sie ermiiglichenden 
Systeme, die aber nicht davon abhngt, daB dieseKomplexit;4t auch 
berechnet, auch kontrolliert werden kann. Wir nennen diese 
emergente Ordnung soziales System" (Luhmann, 1984: 157). 
Unlike normativism, Luhmann's theory design does not have to rely 
on problematic assumptions about factual consensus to account for 
the possibility of orderly interaction. Unlike interpretivism, 
Luhmann's conceptual strategy can do without mutual empathy and 
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cognitive transparence as solutions to the problem of order. For 
Luhmann, mutual understanding does not guarantee orderly 
interaction, since latent self-referential operations assure that 
personal systems are never fully understandable for each other. 
Luhmann's theory of autopoietic systems entails a complete break 
with the 'methodological humanism' or conceptual 'homocentrism' 
(Lemert, 1979) that has dominated much of the sociologica) scene, 
and which even Luhmann himself once accepted as the 'natural' 
attitude of sociologists (Kiss, 1990). This autopoietic paradigm 
change does for sociology what Copernicus once did for the 
sciences. 	 Just as the earth is not at the centre of the 
Copernican universe, human individuals, or 'psychic systems' as 
Luhmann prefers to say, are not at the centre of his version of 
the social system. In fact, Luhmann (1986) even goes further 
than Copernicus by locating the individual outside the social 
system, into its environment. We firmly believe that it is this 
ingenious theoretical 'move' that is responsible for the 
aforementioned conservative, uncritical reaction to his work, 
triggering similar reactions of sheer disbelief in sociology as 
its Copernican counterpart once did in the sciences... The 
vacancy that this decision to de-psychologize sociology entails, 
is filled by the concept of communication. Although aware of the 
fact that there is much more to this autopoietic communications 
theory that meets the eye, we decided to refrain from a highly 
detailed analysis of it. What interests us here is simply its 
theory-strategical value. In line with the autopoietic theorem 
noted above, communication is defined as an emergent reality, a 
state of affairs sui generis. Hence, it is conceived of in such 
a way that "every reference to consciousness or life ... is 
strictly avoided" (Luhmann, 1992: 252). 
	 What is new about 
Luhmann's concept of communication is not really the distinction 
of the three components of information, utterance, and understan-
ding (1992: 252), which is also central to Shannon and Weaver's 
model of communication as a process of transmission (1949), the 
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speech act theories of Austin (1962) and Searle (1969), and the 
typology of validity claims which Habermas develops (1979). The 
novelty of Luhmann's sociological concept of communication 
resides in the emphasis on its emergent, autopoietic and 
inherently social character (1992: 254). It is not disputed that 
the existence of communication is predicated on the existence of 
life, consciousness or any other 'environmental restrictions' 
(Luhmann, 1992: 254). However, it is assumed that the process 
of communication depends on the inherent laws of the communica-
tion system itself, which is ironically expressed in the aphorism 
"only communication can communicate" (Luhmann, 1992: 251). 
Closing this section of our paper, we will briefly try to 
indicate how all this is linked with the way Luhmann conceptualy 
designed his notion of morality. 	 Luhmanian systems theory 
replaces the consensus-directed entelechy with the argument that 
communication leads to a decision whether the uttered and 
understood information is to be accepted or rejected. Communica-
tion - as Luhmann sees it - bifurcates reality. "It creates two 
versions - a yes version and a no version - and thereby forces 
selection. And it is precisely in the fact that something must 
happen (even if this is an explicitly communicated break-off of 
communication) that the autopoiesis of the system resides, 
guaranteeing for itself its own continuability" (Luhmann, 1992: 
255-256). Hence, it should not come as a surprise that Luhmann 
(1991: 84, 1993: 998) defines morality as a special form of 
communication which carries with it indications of approval or 
disapproval. "The moral is not something good. Of course, that 
should not lead us to say that the moral is something bad. [...] 
The moral functions only as a distinction" (Luhmann, 1993: 996). 
It is precisely this binary form of the moral distinction 
good/bad or good/evil that attracts Luhmann's theoretical 
attention. So again he uses the same tactics, and coins a 
concept of morality that fits his view on the problem of social 
order. Again he takes a functional instead of a substantial 
stance and defines the moral with a conceptual eye on its ability 
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to sustain the self-referential reproduction of communication. 
Again the link between morality and consensus is conceptually 
removed (Luhmann, 1978: 43-62). Again morality is conceptualized 
in a strictly sociological fashion. 	 In the hands of this 
extremely technical thinker this of course boils down to a 
concept that bears no reference to psychic systems. "Neither 
life as such, nor the functions of the brain, nor the conscious 
operations of perception and thinking have intrinsic moral 
quality. [...] The moral makes an important difference only in 
communication, namely, a difference in the communicative reaction 
to the expression of esteem or disesteem. [...] There are, in 
other words, no good people or bad people, but only the possibi-
lity of indicating people as good or bad" (Luhmann, 1993: 1000). 
To conclude our presentation we very much want to stress that, 
in our view, both Goffman and Luhmann, each in his own way, open 
up interesting roads for the development of a sociological 
critique of society. 	 Especially their methodological or 
conceptual strategies are regarded by us as very promising. 
The view of Goffman as a cynic appears to depend on the bypassing 
of his fundamental stance taken in Frame Analysis, which perhaps 
does not offer a separate analysis of 'the moral frame', but 
clearly shows in a way that is theoretically useful how the 
social world can be seen to work. It brings to light features 
of the taken-for-granted world and analyzes the way in which 
distinctions are being made in everyday life. It also recognizes 
the ultimate impossibility of making absolute distinctions, both 
for members of society and for sociologists. Whether or not 
individuals manipulate the expressions they 'give' and 'give off' 
and the impressions they convey to others, setting the problem 
as an empirical rather than a moral one is a more promising route 
to sociological understanding. 
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A similar conclusion can be drawn in the case of Luhmann. He 
also is convinced of the necessity of developing a strict 
conceptual strategy. Expressions which society uses to describe 
itself do not represent the way into the formulation of a 
sociological theory. The methodological design of his autopoie-
tic systems theory as a second order perspective, from which 
sociology observes society as a system that is observing itself, 
has the immediate goal of describing social reality in a 
completely different manner. As a controlled instrument for 
observing society, it tries hard to relieve itself of obligations 
to take action or decisions. This is no conservative concern, 
but on the contrary opens up perspectives which were unavailable 
to society itself. As such, he makes an important contribution 
to a sociological critique of modernity. 	 By observing as 
contingent what is taken to be natural, his version of 'sociolo-
gical enlightenment' seems very worthwhile. As in the case of 
Goffman, one of the most important strengths of Luhmann's second 
order theory resides in its - postmodern ? - mixing of theoreti-
cal rigour with intellectual modesty. After all, the autopoietic 
systems theory views itself as a method of observing society 
which operates with justifiable distinctions, but to which 
alternatives can always be developed... 
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